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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ED\V ARD LEE HOLLAND,
Plaintiff,

-vs.THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and COLUl\1BIA - GENEVA
STEEL DIVISION, UNITED STATES
STEEL CORPORATION,

Case No.
8412

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff's application for hearing to settle Industrial Accident Claim was filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah September 13, 1954. It is there alleged
that on or about July 6,1954 while employed at the Horse
Canyon Coal ~line of Columbia-Geneva Steel Division
of United States Steel Corporation plaintiff sustained a
back injury as follows: " * * * was drilling through rock
in roof of the mine. The drill broke and the drill jerked
applicant violently upward." It is also alleged that plaintiff left work on July 21, 1954 and that his disability
had continued to the date of the application.
Columbia-Genev.a Steel Division denied liability and
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hearing was held April 1, 1955. At such hearing the
following facts were made to appear:
Some time in the early part of July, 1954, plaintiff
was employed in defendant's coal mine at Horse Canyon.
On the day of the alleged accident he was on a scaffold
drilling; the drill broke and in some manner plaintiff
lost his hold on the stoper and fell on his hands and
knees, or hands and toe·s (R.20). In about thirty minutes
Mine Foreman Wadleigh appeared at the scene and
asked if plaintiff wanted to go to the hospital. Plaintiff
refused and did not Inention that his back hurt. (R. 45)
Plaintiff continued to work at his regular job for the
next week or two weeks. (R. 26) On July 24, 1954 he
got in touch with Dr. William Ploss (R. 23). About
July 26, he reported to the Clinic (Ex. 2). He was given
some pain killer and eventually on August 7, 1954 admitted to the Utah Permanete Hospital (R. 52, Ex. 1).
Sometime between August 3rd and 7th plaintiff was
terminated for unauthorized absence on August 3rd.
In two separate conversations with his superiors as to
the reason for such termination he was told the termination was for such unauthorized absence. On neither of
these occasions did plaintiff so 1nuch as suggest that his
absence was due to an industrial .accident, a fall in the
mine which injured his back. (R. 46, 61.) In the hospital records there is no indication that his difficulty had
an origin as an industrial accident. (R. 55, 56.) Dr.
Ploss is the doctor of the United 1\fine "\Yorkers Welfare
Fund. Had the injury been clain1ed by the employee to
have an industrial origin it would have been referred to
2
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Dr. James 1\.:. i\fcClintock and by him to the employer and
to the Industrial Commission. Dr. McClintock testified:

Q.

If the employee says it is industrial-

A.

I will report it as such.

Q. You report it as such to the Commrssion.
A.

That is correct.

(R. 55) and"The first implication that I had as a possible industrial involvement was that involving
the Industrial Hearing."
(R. 56)

The case was referred to Dr. Paul A. Pemberton,
who on September 8, 1954 removed an intervertebral
disc. (R. 56) Dr. Pemberton did not report the case to
the Industrial Commission as an industrial case. (R. 59)
On September 13, 1954 the said application was filed
with the Industrial Commission and hearing was held in
due course. On June 21, 1955 decision was rendered
denying compensation :
"Applicant testified that he reported to Dr.
Ploss that he got hurt in the mine. The hospital
record does not corroborate this statement. Dr.
Ploss, the Welfare Fund physician, works in the
same hospital at Dragerton, that Dr. McClintock,
the industrial surgeon for defendant, uses for
industrial patients.
"It can be reasonably assumed that the
Welfare Fund and its medical staff
will promptly refer all cases to Dr. McClintock

U.~LW.A.
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if they are reported as industrial cases. Surely
the Welfare Fund is not seeking to increase an
already heavy burden by voluntarily accepting
industrial cases. In fact, the entire record negatives applicant's testimony to such an extent that
his credibility is highly questionable."
'

t

Applicant did have a disc removed by Dr. Pemberton
but we cannot find that the disc was the result of an
accident arising out of or in the_ course of employment
by defendant as alleged or at all.
Petition for rehearing was filed July 22, 1955, denied
July 27, 1955, and this original proceeding began August
26, 1955 by filing a petition in this court for a Writ of
Review. Nothing more appears until November 14, 1955,
when this court issued, on its own motion, its "Citation
for Dismissal returnable Nov. 21."
That the Commission did not afford credibility to
plaintiff's testimony is, of course, apparent from the
decision itself. Plaintiff was very certain that he had
reported a back injury, sustained in the mine, to Dr.
Ploss and to Thir. Wadleigh. Yet one of these witnesses
denied that he had done so. And the records of the hospital corroborate, not the plaintiff, but Thfr. Wadleigh.
Upon the occasion of his discharge plaintiff made
no mention of having sust·ained an industrial accident.
Plaintiff did not dispute this evidence nor explain why
he had not at that time referred to such an accident. He
would have done so had his trouble been due to such an
accident.
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

~

:

rt(J:

I~

[at

Plaintiff relies on two points:
1. That the Cornmission erred in its conclusion that
plaintiff's injury and disability was not the result of
an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment.
:2. That the Commission abused its discretion in
entering its decision denying an award to plaintiff, .and
that its decision and order were against the law and contrary to the evidence introduced, and that in reaching
such decision, the said Cmnmission did not regularly
pursue its authority.

The two points will be here discussed in order.
Plaintiff's Point 1.
That the Commission erred in its conclusion that plaintiff's injury and disabilty was not the result of an accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment.
n~~

a

~

.Ill

It is true that plaintiff testified that he told Dr.
Ploss that he had been hurt in the mine. But the Commission was not bound to accept this testimony as establishing the fact that he had made such a statement to
Dr. Ploss or that the statement, if made, was true.

~~
Th

.~

It is significant th.at Dr. Ploss did not record the
case as an industrial accident; that it was not referred
to Dr..McClintock, the industrial surgeon working in the
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

same hospital. Dr. .McClintock testified clearly and
positively that if the employee or Company reports the
case as an industrial one, it is reported to defendant
and to the Commission as such.
A.

In other words, if it is reported to me as
industrial, I report it as industrial. If the
Company thinks it isn't we come down here.

Q.

If the employee says it is industrial-

A. I will report it as such.
Q. You report it as such to the Commission'
A. That is correct.

Q.

And that is the procedure which is followed
at your hospital~

A.

That is correct.

Q.

vVhat was the situation in this

A.

I didn't see this man in a professional capacity
until last n1onth when I examined him and
returned him to work. (R. 55)

case~

And l\1:r. Wadleigh :

Q.

If a man falls off a scaffold or jumps off a
scaffold that high and then tells you that he
hurt his back, that he has a stinging sensation
and back pain, would you report that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But you don't recall his 1nentioning that at
alH

A. No, he \\~as shook up, he told n1e. (R. 47)
and the same witness:

Q.

When did ~·on first hear that he was .alleging
a back injnr)· as a result of that fall?
6
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A. I don't recall when I first heard of the back

:n!

being injured. When he was, after he had
been away from work, he called me and I
don't recall the date, and said that the Company had terminated him and asked me why.
And I said I just supposed it was for unauthorized absence. And I asked him why he
wasn't at work, and he told me that he was
having son1e back trouble and that they were
treating him like, for the same trouble that
he had in the year past. * * *

m!

~

ili1
!~.

r:

Q.

Did he tell you at that time that the back
trouble he had, that he got it from the fall~

A.

No.

Q.

Did he ever indicate that was the

A.

I don't recall that, no.

Q.

Did you ever recall his mentioning to you
at all his back trouble being connected with
the fall~

A.

No. (R. 45, 46)

reason~

~1r. James Cassano, then Supervisor Industrial Relations, gave the termination notice. The termination was
for extended, unauthorized absences and in discussing
the cause with plaintiff-

Q.

(Plaintiff) did not rnention that he hurt his
back in the mine at all to you, not at any
time~

A

No, not at any time. Not at .any time. (R. 61)

Mr. Cassano attempted to find the cause of the
absences before giving the termination notice. He could
find nothing in the hospital records .as to any sickness
7
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at that time-he contacted Dr. Ploss.
Q.

Did Dr. Ploss indicate to you at all when
you talked to him that ~Ir. Holland had
claimed that he hurt his back in the mine f

A.

No.*** (R. 63)

Surely a man who has been injured by a fall to the
extent that he was prevented thereby from working would report it to his doctor, his foreman, or to the
official who terminated him. A man who has been fired
for failure to report for duty would naturally and surely
attempt to justify his absence -

and even more surely

would he do so if such absence was due to an industrial
injury sustained while on the very job from which he was
discharged.
Plaintiff's Point 2.
That th·e Commission abused its discretion in entering
its decision denying an award to the plaintiff, and that its
decision and order were against the law and contrary to the
evidence introduced and that in reaching such decision the
said Commission did not regularly pursue its authority.

Here plaintiff seems to argue that the testimony of
Dr. Ploss and Dr. Pe1nberton should be received.
rrhe testimony of Dr. Ploss could add nothing to the
record rnade before the Conunission. It already clearly
appear:::; that had the alleged injury been considered in8
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dustrial by the Company or by the employee himself it
would have been reported as such and the hospital records would show that claim. And the uncontradicted
fact is that it was not reported, nor do the records show
it, as industrial (R. 55).

These facts are not assump-

tions known only to Dr. Ploss; they are clearly established
by undisputed evidence.
Dr. Pemberton did not see the plaintiff until September, 1954, and it must be assumed that had the case
been considered as industrial he would have made the
required report to the Commission.
The record is silent as to why Drs. Ploss and Pemberton were not called as witnesses. Plaintiff made no
request that the matter be postponed or continued until
these doctors could be called.
The statement of this court in Nielson et al. v. Industrial Commission (1917) 120 Utah 526, 236 P. 2d
346, is controlling here:
"The principles announced in Woodburn v.
Ind. Comm., 1947, 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 209,
seem controlling and we cannot say as a matter
of law the evidence is susceptible of no other interpretation than that contended for by plaintiffs,
- or that the findings of the Commission were
arbitrary, capricious and unsupported by any
substantial evidence."
9
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rrhe rule of law is cle.ar as stated in Kent v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 381, 57 P. 2d 724:
"In the case of denial of compensation, the
record must disclose that there is maferial, substantial, competent, 'Uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a m.atter of law, that the Commission
.arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such
evidence.
"When we are asked to overturn the findings
and conclusions of the Commission denying compensation, it must be made clearly to appear that
the Commission acted wholly without cause in
rejecting or in refusing to believe or give effect
to the evidence."
Plaintiffs' own witnesses testified that he comtjlained of hack trouble before the alleged accident.

Q.

Did he complain about the, you say you didn't
hear him complain about his back for a short
tin1e thereafter~

A.

~ o, he'd say, "~Iy back hurts me this morning," or maybe we'd sit down and e·at our
lunch and he'd get up and say, "My back is
stiff, or back is hurting."

Q.

When did he say

A.

\Yell different ti1ne in the mine, you know.

Q.

Oh, all the time'

A.

this~

Oh no, not all the tin1e. l\I.aybe a week or so
know, or something like that.

~~ou

Q.

You are speaking before, even before this Y
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

n~

om.

:nal

liD·

f.

A.

Oh yes.

Q.

Even before this he'd say this from time to
time~

A.

My back hurts me quite often too.

Q. And he'd say the same thing after he fell
A.

off~

Oh yes.

Q. You didn't notice any difference in what he
complained about~
A.

Not particularly, no. Not at the time. I only
worked two days I believe after he got hurt.

Q. But even prior to that time, just like maybe
you did a lot of times, he'd say, "My back
hurts me."
A. Yes,***
Of course the Industrial Commission was entitled to
credit this testimony and to hold that the accident, if
it happened, was not the cause of any injury to plaintiff's back.
The Industrial Commission of Utah of course has
had .a long and wide experience with the operation and
administration of medical plans, both industrial and
nonindustrial. It knows from that experience, as must
be apparent to all, that those in charge of a nonindustrial plan will not accept .any case if there be a reasonable hope or justification for passing the burden to an
industrial plan.
In particular the Commission is fully familiar with
the operation and management of the Welfare andRe11
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tirement Fund of the United :Mine vVorkers of America
and the procedure used by that organization when any
industrial injury, actual or suspected, is involved. It is
noteworthy that not only Dr. Ploss failed to consider the
injury, if any, industrial, but that Dr. William A. Dorsey of the Denver office of that fund accepted plaintiff's
application for medical services under that plan, (Ex.
2) and payments were made to and accepted by plaintiff.
From July 1, 1954 up to and including Dr. Pemberton's post-operative letter to Dr. Ploss (Ex. 2) there is
no reference to an industrial accident or to any claim that
the injury was due to such an accident. It is apparent
that along the line somewhere some reference to an industrial accident would have been made had there been
any foundation for such a claim or assertion.
Since the entire record refutes plaintiff's contention
the Commission was at perfect liberty to question his
credibility .and enter findings contrary to his testimony.
CONCLUSION

There is evidence in the record sufficient to support
the findings and conclusions of the Commission:

First: Plaintiff complained of back trouble before
and after the accident.
Seco11d: Plaintiff di(l not, to his doctors, to his forernan or to Cmnpany upon the occasion of his discharge,
al-i~wrt or clain1 that he had sustained an industrial accident.
12
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Third: In spite of the practice of reporting all accidents as industrial claimed by the employee to be such,
this accident was not reported as industrial to any doctor
or to the Commission.
Fourth: Plaintiff's hack difficulty was treated and
considered by the Welfore ~-,und itself as nonindustrial.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
Attorney for Industrial
Commission of Utah,
C. C. PARSONS,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for ColumbiaGeneva Steel Division, United
States Steel Corporation.
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